With the recent passing of Scottish moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1929-2025), the intellectual world mourns the loss of a thinker who tackled profound questions during his lifetime. MacIntyre’s work remains essential not only for those interested in moral and political philosophy but also for anyone seeking to understand the crisis of modernity. I had the opportunity to discuss his legacy with one of his Italian scholars, Sergio Belardinelli, a close collaborator and friend.
MacIntyre, particularly through his seminal work After Virtue (1981), is a thinker whose ideas demand attention. In a recent article in Il Foglio, you mention him as “one of the most important thinkers of our time.” What makes him so significant?
There are at least three fundamental issues on which MacIntyre shed light, making him one of the most important thinkers of our time: the nature of man, virtue, and the common good. MacIntyre critiqued the failure of the Enlightenment project, arguing that contemporary moral theory has fallen prey to dangerous individualistic emotivism. He presents an Aristotelian realist paradigm where human beings must strive to actualize their inherent goodness to fulfill their telos. Instead of viewing ethics as mere expressions of sentiments, MacIntyre emphasizes the narrative nature through which individuals achieve their identity and goodness in various practices of life.
Speaking of the concept of the good leads us to another significant question: that of truth. Why is truth so essential, especially in a liberal society?
While “good” and “truth” may not be interchangeable, both concepts are crucial for a liberal society that values individual dignity and freedom. MacIntyre’s advocacy for an objective, non-relativistic conception of the good serves as a counterpoint to the cultural and institutional degradation in our liberal democracies, emphasizing the importance of ethical guidance grounded in truth rather than subjective preferences.
In MacIntyre’s philosophical framework, the concept of practice plays a central role. What does MacIntyre mean by this term, and why is it so important?
MacIntyre defines practice as a socially established form of cooperative human activity where inherent values are realized through the pursuit of shared models and goals. Practices, whether in sports, academia, arts, or craftsmanship, require adherence to rules and cultivation of virtues to achieve excellence. Virtues serve as objective criteria defining our relationships within these practices, emphasizing the importance of virtue ethics in guiding interactions with others.
The notion of virtue is a challenging concept in contemporary culture. MacIntyre writes that acting virtuously involves cultivating inclinations shaped by virtues. As a Catholic and liberal, what does this mean to you? Are freedom and virtue at odds, or are they integral to a healthy anthropological view?
For a Catholic liberal, the discourse on virtue, as seen in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, precedes a deeper exploration of politics and the pursuit of happiness. While MacIntyre may have differing views, a Catholic liberal finds a balance between objective justice and individual freedom, steering clear of political constructs that seek to impose a singular notion of beauty and justice. This approach ensures a space for both truth and freedom, away from the pitfalls of political constructivism.
